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As more and more mainland private enterprises choose to go IPO in Hong 
Kong Stock Exchange nowadays, it is meaningful to illustrate the general procedures 
and considerations of listing in Hong Kong. Our paper provides a general description 
of these issues through a case study — Wumart Store, Inc., a mainland private 
company in retail industry. We also conduct a research on IPO underpricing and 
Post-IPO performance by a sample pool of 20 companies. IPO underpricing is a 
general phenomenon among these companies. Using the same sample pool, we 
explore the Post-IPO performance with a period of one year. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
With the continuous development towards a market economy, many Chinese 
private enterprises have entered into a flourishing phase. According to the All-China 
Federation of Industry & Commerce，the Chinese private business sector contributed 
more than 60% to the national economy in 2004. 
However, the process of their expansion has never been unobstructed, as many 
of these private enterprises are having funding difficulties. Initially, the source of 
funds comes from deposits or loans from the personal network. At this phrase, the 
scale of companies is relatively small and the need of funds is not the primary concern. 
Nonetheless, more and more funds are needed eventually for further development to 
achieve a certain level of growth and expansion. In the following, a case of Wumart 
Stores, a Chinese private company which has listed successfully on the Hong Kong 
Capital market will be analyzed. Our aim is to demonstrate how a large scale Chinese 
private company with healthy operations can overcome funding obstacles through 
listing. 
Wumart Stores is a private company, in which its main business is operating a 
retail chain. The company was founded by Dr. Zhang Wenzhong on August 9，2000. 
In November 21, 2003, Wumart Stores was successfully listed in the Growth 
Enterprise Market (GEM) of the Hong Kong exchange. The funds raised through 
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Initial Public Offerings (IPO) amounted to 547,061,440 HK$ and the offering was 
152.30 times oversubscribed, contributing to its major listing success. 
Chapter 1 is the introduction. 
Chapter 2 is the general description of IPO process. Practical issues 
concerning IPO such as pros and cons of public offering, selection of advisors, and 
reorganization are discussed. 
Chapter 3 is the methodology. Data sources and research period are 
summarized. 
Chapter 4 is the analysis of underpricing extent for different companies of the 
retail sector of Hong Kong Stock Exchange. 
Chapter 5 is the analysis of post-IPO performance for the same sample pool. 
This section also explores the relationship between IPO underpricing and post-IPO 
performance. 
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CHAPTER 2: GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF IPO 
PROCESS 
REASONS FOR LISTING 
Generally speaking, private enterprises have two choices in raising funds: 
equity financing and/or debt financing. Under the current Chinese financial system, 
both channels are not easily accessible for private enterprises. 
Debt Financins 
Theoretically, there are three channels for debt financing: (1) banks or other 
financial institutions, (2) bond issuance and (3) private sources. In reality, due to the 
credit management mechanism and the current banking regulation system, all these 
channels seem to be difficult to be approached by the private companies. As for bond 
issuance, the current Chinese bond market is still immature and rigidly regulated. 
Thus, almost no private company has ever raised money through the bond market. 
Comparatively, borrowing from private sources is more feasible. However, there are 
still two major obstacles: (1) the funds are too small and fragmented to satisfy the 
financing needs of larger private companies, and (2) the legal system is insufficiently 
developed to protect the involved parties. 
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Equity Financing 
There are mainly two ways for private companies to raise funds through the 
issuance of equity, and they are private placement and the public offering. Private 
placement is comparably more popular because of its simpler procedures. Potential 
investors include individual investors, venture capitalists, investment companies and 
other corporate investors. On the other hand, public offeringis more demanding, in 
terms of the quality and the scale of the private companies. 
Comparison between the IPO and Debt financine 
In weighing the advantages and disadvantages (See Table 1) of different 
financing methods, private companies have to take their own conditions as well as the 
external capital market into account. When a private company determines its optimal 
financial structure, the following key factors should be considered: capability to raise 
capital, usage and amount of capital, cost of financing, and flexibility of alternatives. 
Obviously, issuers also need to think about the sustainability of the financing way, 
profitability of investment project, the regulatory policies, and its current situation in 
the financial market. 
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Table 1 ： Comparison between IPO and Debt Financing 
IPO Debt Financing 
1. No need of credit rating and collateral 
2. Improvement on Debt ratio, liquidity ratio i r» , , ‘；, r 1. Preserved equity and and leverage ratio , 
3. Reputation increased in both the industry and ^ D^uctible interest 
the financial market ‘ 
4. Easier to refinance in capital market � exposes ^ ^^  . r 1 1 3. Shorter process Pros 5. No interest expenses, no payback pressure . . . ^ j j , rr- , 1- -I-, r , , 1 1 4. No complicated and 6. High liquidity for shareholders . . , . , , 
7. Potential access to different capital markets ^ n 议 ^ ‘ . , . ^ , ,, surveillance of different countnes and regions at the same ^ No risk of hostile time . ‘ 1 
8. Dividends are exempted from income 
taxation 
1. Original shareholders have to release at least ^ • Uncertain interest „ , expenses, in case of 25% of shares „ ^ . . 2. Long duration (2-3 years in Mainland china, � r» � j ‘ 1 . TTT,� 2. Rating needed, assets ^ 1 year in HK) , f , i j i Cons 1 1. ‘ J J . .J 1. 1 J have to be pledged 3. Complicated and rigid listing rules and ^ ^ JT . 3. Pressure oi paying surveillance . , 丄 I . TT- u ‘ interests and 
4 . High cost RIJ^ EI ^^^ OF 5. Risk of hostile takeover f , ' bankruptcy 
Backsround of Wumart 
The mission of Wumart Stores is to develop China's own retail industry, and 
improve the public's living quality, and its vision is to become one of the leading 
integrated retail network operators in the People's Republic of China (PRC). 
To achieve its ambitious missions, Wumart Stores has planned and 
implemented a series of expansion projects. These projects included: expanding 
Wumart's retail network in China, building up "Wumart" as a nationwide retail brand, 
enhancing Wumart's operations, information and logistics systems, and improving the 
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quality of Wumart's human resources. In order to implement these projects, Wumart 
was in need of a large amount of funds. However, Wumart's capability to raise from 
debt markets was not very strong because of its private company's status and its 
limited collateral. On 31 May 2003，right before its listing, Wumart's fixed tangible 
assets amounted to a mere RMB 54.9 million. Being a retail chain company, 
expansion was rightly a reasonable and necessary business strategy. Thus, Equity 
financing seemed to be a favourable tool to seek funds and refinance. 
6 
SELECTION OF CAPITAL MARKET 
Once private companies have decided to have IPO, they must consider which 
stock exchange to list on. For Chinese private companies, there are primarily four 
accessible stock markets: Domestic A share stock market, Hong Kong stock market, 
Singapore stock market and National Association of Securities Dealers automatic 
quotation market (NASDAQ). We will discuss the four stock exchanges according to 
the following nine perspectives: 
Consideration 1: Time span of IPO 
To be listed on Hong Kong stock market, it generally takes within one year. 
However, as more and more Mainland companies seek listing status in this market, 
the time span has been increasing. For Singapore stock market or NASDAQ, the time 
span is relatively short, generally 6-9 months. In case of China A shares, due to a 
large number of applicants, a company must enter a queue to be listed. The shortest 
time exceeds 2 years including one year of tutoring period. 
Consideration 2: Consecutive manasement operations 
The stock markets of Hong Kong, China A share and Singapore all require the 
candidate company to have three years of consecutive operations. During the three 
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years period, the top management, the shareholders, and the key technicians should 
maintain stably to demonstrate that the company is of high quality and mature, while 
there is no such specific regulation for NASDAQ. 
Consideration 3: Requirement on consecutive holding 
According to Hong Kong's listing rules, the issuer should maintain its 
shareholder status for at least 1 year. During the first half of the year, the controlling 
shareholders are forbidden to sell their shares, and during the second half of the year, 
the controlling shareholders are restricted to sell out the amount of shares which make 
them lose the controlling status. The restrictions also apply to the China A share stock 
market, but not the Singapore stock market or NASDAQ. 
Consideration 4: IPO pricing 
In the Hong Kong stock market, the offer price is based on the company's 
operating performance as well as the market environment, without any ceiling or floor. 
During pricing, the model of profit prediction is extensively adopted. PE ratio of 
issues is ranged between 10 and 20. In this aspect, the Singapore stock market is very 
similar, while its PE ratio would be around 10. 
The China A share market has a more complicated system. According to 
Mainland regulation rules, the PE ratio of IPO should not exceed 20 and the funds 
raised should not amount to more than twice of the company's net assets. Instead of 
an estimated future profit, historical profit data are used to determine the offer price. 
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Further, an empirical research for Chinese companies the PE ratio of issues on 
NASDAQ is slightly higher than the ones of Hong Kong and Singapore. 
Consideration 5: Seasoned issue 
In Hong Kong, the company is not allowed to have seasoned issue within 6 
months after the IPO. Thereafter, there will be no time limitations as long as the 
seasoned issue is approved by the board or at the shareholders meeting. Likewise, 
there is a similar restriction for the Singapore stock market, but it is only limited up 
to3 months of time. As to the China A share stock market, the company can only 
pursue a seasoned issue once a year and the regulations on seasoned issues are very 
strict, including minimum ROE requirements. Besides, the issuance of options and 
derivatives is prohibited in this market. 
Consideration 6: Market liquidity 
In terms of liquidity, the Hong Kong stock market is ranked the top. All 
shares of listed companies are tradable in the Hong Kong stock market. . In 2003，the 
average trade volume per day was USD 1.3 billion. Although the shares in Singapore 
are also tradable, its liquidity is not as high as in Hong Kong. Its daily average trade 
volume only amounted to USD90 million. In China, not all the shares can be traded in 
full on A Share stock market, especially the listed state-owned enterprises (SOE). 
These shares are known as circulation shares. National shares and corporate shares 
cannot be traded in the market under the current system and it will take issuers three 
years before they sell. The daily average trading volume in 2004 amounted to 
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USD 1.312 billion. For NASDAQ, all shares of listed companies can be traded freely. 
The trading volume for Asian companies is comparatively small and the degree of 
liquidity is low due to unfamiliarity. 
Consideration 7: Corny any imase 
Basically, successfully listing in Hong Kong, Singapore or NASDAQ can help 
enhancing the international reputation, while listed in China can only promote the 
company's image nationally and its international influence would be limited. 
However, the Hong Kong stock market would be considered to be the only platform, 
which can improve the company's image both nationally and globally. Mainland 
Consideration 8: Investors 
Investors in Hong Kong are more familiar with the main land companies' 
information and easily understand the general performance. Professional analysts in 
this market are generally highly qualified and can provide a high level of analysis. 
Investors in Singapore are less familiar with companies from the Chinese Mainland. 
Some professional analysts cover Chinese listed companies, but not as many as in 
Hong Kong. Investors in the China A share stock market are the most familiar with 
the Chinese companies. However, the analysts' level of qualification is considerably 
lower than those in international stock markets. Furthermore, since the market's 
inception credibility and integrity standards have been generally low, investors in 
NASDAQ stock market are the least familiar with Chinese. 
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Consideration 9: Market Capitalization 
By December 31，2004，the total market capitalizations of the Hong Kong 
stock market, the Singapore stock market, the China A share market and NASDAQ 
amounted to USD 830.7 billion, USD 174.2 billion, USD313.4 billion and 
USD3.38trillion respectively. Generally speaking, the larger the capital market is, the 
more funds circulate, the easier it is for a company to be listed successfully. 
Historically, the China A share stock market was used to be the first choice for 
Chinese private companies seeking listing status. However, the recent adverse factors, 
such as long waiting periods, rigid regulation of seasoned issues and lack of credit of 
the market, have compelled more and higher quality private companies to look outside 
China. 
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Pros and cons of the three markets 
Table 2 Comparison among three markets 
Hong Kong stock Singapore Stock N A S D A O 
market Market 
1. Medium listing 
cost (10%-20% of 
total IPO) 
2. Major financial , t i. J •, 1. Looser listing centre, liquid i t i. ‘. ‘ . ‘ 1 1 T^^ J 1. Low listing cost requirements market, IPO and , … i 應 � ‘ ^ , „ t, �� �50/0-IO0/0 of total than Hong Kong seasoned issue can , . . IPO) market - 广, 丄 ^ ^ 2. Loose listing rules 2. High reputation n 3. Close to the , , . r . Pros � � • 1 J and less rigid for companies Mainland, many , , . , , . financial surveillance listed in this 
. . 3. High-tech and market institutions cover , ^ c v ui u- u . . SMEs are welcome 3. Suitable for high-China companies • � . � ‘ � t^  j tt . , . , in this market tech and IT 4. Institutional . „ d companies investors from the 
Mainland enter this 
market, targeting 
China companies 
1. Complicated listing 1. Very high listing 
rules are and rigid cost 
surveillance 2. Lack of 
2. More and more institutional 
strict censor investors 
procedure covering Chinese 
3. Scepticism of 1. Investors not companies, low 
investors and familiar with liquidity for 
Cons regulator towards Chinese companies Chinese 
Chinese private 2. Small market, not companies 








Following the analysis in Table 2，it seems that for a private company with 
certain scale and good performance, the Hong Kong stock market is the most 
favourable. Although the listing cost is higher and the regulation is more rigid, for 
well organized companies, listing in this rigid market may represent a high degree of 
quality and therefore, the development of the companies may further be facilitated. 
The high liquidity and comparatively simple procedure for seasoned issues can also 
benefit shareholders, while when listing in foreign stock markets, the companies are 
generally undervalued due to the unfamiliarity with the Chinese companies. 
Back to the case of Wumart, the company management hoped to capitalize on 
the fast growing Chinese economy by broadening its retail operations, as the 
company's rivals were also expanding quickly. Due to the longer waiting period on 
the China A share market, Wumart stores chose to go public on a foreign stock market. 
Hong Kong's ties with the Mainland have become increasingly close. As a retail 
company, listing in Hong Kong stock market would improve the company's 
reputation, and attract more customers and potentials business partners. In fact, it is a 
comprehensive consideration for Wumart to choose the Hong Kong stock market. 
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GEM OR MAINBOARD 
There are two boards in the Hong Kong stock market: the Mainboard and 
GEM. Below is the outline of the differences between the two boards in light of a 
private company's decision for listing. 
Consideration 1: Location of incorporation 
Both boards accept companies incorporated under the law systems of Hong 
Kong, Bermuda, the Cayman Islands and China PRC. For private enterprises, they can 
choose to be incorporated in China PRC and listed as H shares or choose to be 
incorporated outside of China PRC and listed as Red Chips. This will not affect which 
board they are aimed at. 
Consideration 2: Profits requirements 
The Mainboard requires that profits in the three years preceding the IPO 
should exceed HKD 50 million. The last year's profit should amount to more than 20 
million HK$, and the first two years' profit should amount to more than 30 million 
HK$. For the GEM, because the high-growth enterprises may not generate profit in 
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the initial phase, there is no profit requirement. Nevertheless, the enterprises must 
demonstrate that they have businesses of both substance and potential. 
Consideration 3: Operatius history 
Listing on the Mainboard requires company having at least three years' 
business records with continuous management. The GEM requires at least two years' 
active business records with continuous management and shareholders. However, in 
GEM, the Exchange may accept a shorter period of active business than two years. 
The reasons acceptable to the Exchange in the following cases: (1) in respect of 
newly-formed "project" companies (for example a company formed for the purposes 
of a major infrastructure project); (2) in respect of natural resource exploitation 
companies; and (3) in exceptional circumstances under which the Exchange considers 
it desirable to accept a shorter period. 
Consideration 4: Main business 
There is no special regulation in the Mainboard, while for the GEM, the 
company should have an active main business. Specifically, the company should be 
actively engaged in one focused line of business rather than two or more disparate 
businesses. The reason for this is that the Exchange expects an applicant's 
management to be devoting its attention towards advancing one core business rather 
than a variety of concerns which compete or may compete for their attention. 
However, businesses regarded as peripheral in nature are also acceptable. 
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Consideration 5: Sponsorship period after IPO 
On the Mainboard, if the company has listed H Shares, the company should 
hire a sponsor as advisor one year after IPO, while if the company is listed as a Red 
Chip, there is no such requirement. On the GEM, the company should hire a sponsor 
as advisor during the fiscal year of the IPO and for the following two complete fiscal 
years. 
Consideration 6: Moratorium period 
Mainboard has prohibited the controlling shareholders from selling shares 
within the first 6 months after the IPO, and should maintain their controlling status for 
another 6 months. On the GEM, management shareholders cannot sell their shares 
within 1 year after the IPO, while shareholders with holdings of less than 1% are 
allowed to sell their shares after 6 months following the IPO. 
Consideration 7: Market Capitalization 
On the Mainboard, the company must have a market value of more than HKD 
200 million at the time of IPO, while on the GEM, there is no specific regulation; 
however, a minimum of HKD 46 million is expected to be maintained due to the 
public interest. This is mainly because at the time listing, if the market capitalization 
of the company is not exceeding HKD 100 million, the minimum prescribed 
percentage of securities to be in public hands must be over 20%, which is amounted to 
be more than HKD 30 million. 
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Consideration 8: Public float 
For the Mainboard, the minimum public float is 50 million HK$ or 25% of 
shares outstanding, whichever is higher. If the market value is higher than HKD 4 
billion, the proportion may be lowered to 10%. In the case of GEM, if the company's 
market value is less than 4 billion HK dollars at the time of the IPO, then the public 
float should amount to at least 25% of shares outstanding and to no less than HKD 30 
million. If the market value of the company exceeds HKD 4 billion at the time of the 
IPO, the public float can be adjusted at 20% or HKD 1 billion, whichever is larger. 
Consideration 9: Shareholders Requirements 
For Management shareholders' and significant shareholders, in the Mainboard, 
there is no specific regulation on minimum holding shares. While for the GEM the 
total shares held by management shareholders and significant shareholders should be 
no less than 35% of shares outstanding. For the number of shareholders, 
Mainboardthe company should have at least 300 shareholders at the time of the IPO, 
and also every 1 million HK$ shares should be held by no less than 3 shareholders on 
the Mainboard, while on the GEM, the company should have at least 100 shareholders 
at the time of IPO. 
In our case, Wumart had to choose GEM, because it had operating losses in 
the year of 2000. Thus, its profit of three years' operation is less than 50 million HK$, 
which conflicted with the listing rules of the Mainboard. 
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H SHARE OR RED CHIP OR ELSE 
After we have discussed which market or board to list on for the private 
companies, we like to draw the attention to the selection between two branches, Red 
Chips and H Shares. Companies listed as H Shares are incorporated in Mainland 
China, in which the main operation is based in Mainland China. Contrarily, 
Companies listed as Red Chips are incorporated outside Mainland China and the 
applicable jurisdiction is different from that of China PRC. However, the company 
should be controlled by the Chinese parties from the Mainland, with a share of over 
30%.The main business of Red Chips companies can be located in the Mainland, 
Hong Kong or overseas. Below are the generalized considerations affecting which 
branch a company will list in. 
Firstly, when the company is listed as a Red Chip, all its shares can be traded 
in the stock market. In contrast, only part of the shares of a company listed as an H 
Share can be traded. Secondly, an H Share company can issue A shares in Mainland 
China, while a Red Chip cannot do so. Thirdly, it is very difficult for an H Share 
company to issue options as an incentive for employees. However a Red Chips 
company has no such difficulties. Fourthly, the share of the H Share companyheld by 
management shareholders cannot be traded or circulated without approval from the 
regulator. As a result, the value of this part of shares will be lower comparing to the 
shares in circulation. Red Chips are excluded from this restriction.. Fifthly, seasoned 
issues are restricted for H Share companies and can occur only once each year, while 
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Red Chips companies have no such limitations. Sixthly, to be listed, an H Share 
company has to gain approval from both the China Securities Regulatory Commission 
(SRC) and the HK Securities and Futures Commission (SFC). The process generally 
takes longer than that of the Red Chips company. Companies pursuing listing status as 
Red Chips do not need approval by the China SRC. According to the China SRC, 
companies seeking to be listed as H Shares should satisfy the following terms, in 
which companies seeking listing status as Red Chips do not need to comply with 
1) The net assets are no less than 400 million RMB 
2) The after tax profits in the year prior to the IPO are no less than 60 million 
RMB 
3) Funds raised are no less than 50 million US$ 
Interestingly, Wumart Stores pursued an H Share listing status. The main 
consideration was likely the risk of acquisition. Wumart store is a high quality 
company presumably with a promising future. However, its net equity is rather low. 
This kind of company is typically a good acquisition target. 
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BASIC LISTING PROCEDURE 
Step 1: Initial preparation of the IPO 
The new issuer will hire a financial advisor to prepare for IPO. The 
preparation includes a feasibility study and the provision of relevant supporting 
documents. .In the course of its due diligence, the financial advisor will ensure the 
completion of a detailed questionnaire. The issuer will provide answers to the 
questionnaire and discuss with the financial advisor on issues concerned. Both parties 
will collaborate to conclude whether the issuer is suitable for the public listing and, if 
possible, will make an initial listing plan. This plan will cover the location of listing, 
the time of the public offer, the business to be listed, potential problems and the 
solutions. To facilitate the whole listing process, the issuer will appoint one top 
manager to take charge of the listing. Lastly, the issuer should provide all the crucial 
legal and business documents since the date of the company's establishment. 
Step 2: Selection of professional advisors 
The company will consider the following three aspects in its selection process. 
The first concern is the brand image of the candidates. If the financial consulting 
company is well-established and widely recognized by investors, it will have a higher 
chance to get the bid. The second concern is the professional experience of the advisor. 
It will be advantageous if the advisor has already advised comparable companies in 
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the same industry to successfully float in Hong Kong. Finally, according to our 
interviewee, effective teamwork will be critical to the float, since the involved parties 
need to cooperate very closely. 
Step 3: Preparation of application documents 
According to the listing rules, the issuer should provide historical financial 
statements, forecasts, taxation documents and the valuation of assets. All these 
financial data should be audited and included in the prospectus. In addition, 
information such as the profiles of the management team, the structure of corporate 
governance, and the articles of association are also the important elements of the 
prospectus. Furthermore, the future business plan, especially the usage of the capital 
raised should be clearly declared. When the professional advisors prepare the 
prospectus, they have to demonstrate due diligence for the benefit of the investors. 
Step 4: Submission of application materials 
Once all the documentation^ is completed, the application has to be submitted 
to the Hong Kong stock Exchange (HKEX). The HKEX will arrange a hearing^ to 
evaluate the application. If the application is approved, dates will then be set for 
listing. 
‘GEM Listing Rules - Equity Securities (Chapter 12) on requirement of documents submitted to Hong 
Kong Stock Exchange 
2 GEM Listing Rules - Equity Securities (Chapter 12) on provisional hearing date. 
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Step 5: Pricing of the offer 
It is often critical that analysts and underwriters understand the likely demand 
for the shares for price setting. The pricing and placement are usually managed by the 
sponsor, who will recommend an offer price to the market. The company's 
performance to date is the key determinant for setting the offer price. Comparative 
analysis of other companies in similar sectors is also a useful and common tool. 
Analysts will look at the likely market capitalisation, price/earnings ratio and other 
such criteria during the price-setting phase. 
Step 6: Promotion to global financial market 
This is a pivotal phase - it is where the ownership entitlements to the company 
are offered to the market. Frequent marketing will occur at the same time as pricing. 
However, it is important for potential investors to gain some idea of the potential price 
of the shares before commitment. Therefore, pricing will generally have occurred 
before mainstream marketing of the offer is undertaken. 
Once the HKEX has approved the registration statement and a preliminary 
prospectus has been distributed to interested investors, the investment bankers will 
start to organize road shows. These road shows serve two purposes. First, they 
generate interest among potential investors and provide information about the offering. 
Second, they provide information to the issuing firm and its underwriters about the 
2 2 
price at which they will be able to market the securities. These indications of interest 
are called a book and the process of polling potential investors is called book building. 
It is important that the executive management of the company is at the 
frontline of the marketing activities. The executive management should be responsible 
for selling the company story in a powerful and compelling way. Convincing 
investors - particularly institutional - to buy the shares will assist in a successful float. 
Step 7: Listins in Hons Kong Stock Exchanse 
At this final stage, the company has to ensure that the listing date is communicated to 
the market through press releases or other forms of public announcement. Generally, 
the IPO reflects a combined offer form, which 25% of the shares are offered to public 
investors in Hong Kong and the rest is placed to overseas investors, such as 
international institutional investors. 
If the subscription rate is desirably high, the main underwriter and the issuer 
may use the "claw-back" and "over-allotment option" to ensure that a sufficient 
number of shares is allocated to investors, especially to local investors. These 
adjustment mechanisms should be consistent with the regulation rules of SFC. A 
company stock ticker code is then created to identify the stock on all stock trading 
boards and electronic screens. 
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CONSIDERATIONS OF RESTRUCTURING 
Restructuring is one pivotal phase for preparing the IPO because the offering 
will affect not only ownership structure and business, but also assets and human 
resources. The goal of restructuring is to form a solid platform for the future 
development of the company. First of all, restructuring should be guided by the laws 
and rules of both China and Hong Kong. Secondly, not only the core business of the 
company has to be competitive in the market at this point in time, but it needs to offer 
an attractive growth story for the next 3 to 5 years. The funds raised in the pre-IPO 
and IPO phases could support the business development plan of the company. In 
addition, the issuer should meaningfully organize the relationships with the listing 
company, the parent companies and the related companies and try to reduce the 
related transactions as much as possible. Specifically, the parent company should not 
compete with the listing company in the same industry. Furthermore, the issuer should 
continuously improve corporate governance and employee productivity, in order to 
maximize the value of the shareholders' ultimately. 
There are lots of considerations during restructuring. The immediate one is 
taxation. The problem is to decide whether the parent company or the listed company 
bear the listing cost. The dilution of stake, as well as ownership structure, should also 
be thought over to estimate the effect on future business operations. The direct 
purpose of restructuring is to improve the listed company's competitiveness in the 
industry. Thus the non-core and/or peripheral business lines, according to our 
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interviewee, should be separated from the issuer. The issuer should also evaluate the 
situation of related transactions after restructuring. If related transactions decrease, the 
restructuring will tend to be more acceptable. Furthermore, the issuer will estimate the 
effect of restructuring on the historical financial data and report to the HKEX. Finally, 
the issuer and its professional advisors will, according to the company's practical 
needs, choose one or more of the following re-structuring methods: separation of non-
performance assets, exchange for high qualified assets, and re-arrangement of 
liabilities. 
The main reorganization activity Wumart Stores has performed was to convert 
the company from a limited liability company into a joint stock limited company. This 
reorganization served as a listing preparation. 
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ROLE OF FINANCIAL ADVISORS 
Generally speaking, the advisor will co-ordinate and control the whole IPO 
process. One of the task is to suggest how to restructure the existing business lines to 
make future business plans more appealing to investors. The advisor will also give 
advice in issues related to listing rules, such as related transactions and competition 
with the parent company, and recommend the best way and place of listing and assist 
in preparing the prospectus and other documents for IPO application. Besides, the 
advisor will coordinate and help the company to get necessary approval as well as 
exemption from the regulation departments of the SFC and the HKEX. Last but not 
the least, strategic investors will also be introduced to the company. 
For the responsibilities of sponsors, they will conduct the feasibility study of 
listing by carrying out due diligence in the early stage to assess the qualification of the 
company for an IPO. Skills and experiences of the top management will then be 
evaluated and the obligations as executives of a listed company to the management 
team will be fully explained. This process can assist them in deciding whether to go 
public or not. In the IPO stage, they act as the main communication channel between 
the HKEX and the listing company. Moreover, they cooperate with other professional 
advisors such as accountants and lawyers to prepare the application documentation. 
Additionally, sponsors are required to sign on the application and guarantee forms. 
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CHAPTER 3: DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
RESEARCH PERIOD AND SOURCE 
We examine the companies which go IPO in Hong Kong from 1994 to 2004. 
All these companies are in the retail sector. We conduct the interviews with the 
investment bankers who have the first-hand experience on pricing the equities during 
IPO. 
Information of the company name, listing date, offering price, is collected 
from the prospectus, Reuters, and the website of Hong Kong Exchange. The figure of 
funds raised by each IPO is obtained from Hong Kong Exchange's Fact Book 1994-
2004. The closing prices of the IPO firms are extracted from the on-line database 
DATASTREAM. Also, the Hang Seng Index in the corresponding day is extracted 
from DATASTREAM as well. 
MEASURES AND FORMULAS 
We give measures of underpricing and post-IPO performance in Chapter 4 and 
Chapter 5 respectively. 
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CHAPTER 4: UNDERPRICING ANALYSIS 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Initial public offering (IPO) underpricing, or high IPO initial return, is a 
phenomenon common to most stock markets - both in developed and emerging 
economies. A common perception is that underpricing of IPOs is a contradiction to 
market efficiency and may hurt emerging firms trying to raise capital for expansion. 
Therefore it has spawned an extensive literature attempting to explain this apparent 
financial anomaly. A number of theories of IPO underpricing have been put forth and 
tested against the data of various stock markets. We would like to list three well 
known models in the followings. 
Rock's (1986) model 
Two classes of IPO investors are assumed to exist, informed and uninformed. 
Informed investors, having learned the true firm value through costly information 
search activities, will only subscribe to issues that they know to be underpriced, 
whereas uninformed investors will subscribe to all issues. As a result, the uninformed 
investors face a winner's curse, in that their expected return, conditional upon being 
allocated shares, is less than their expected return, conditional upon submitting a 
purchase order. In order to secure the uninformed investors' participation in the 
market for IPOs, issuers must then underprice their shares to ensure that the 
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uninformed investors' expected return conditional upon being allocated shares is non-
negative. 
Ex-ante uncertainty model 
Beatty and Ritter (1986) argues that underpricing increases with uncertainty. 
The model includes a price setting mechanism for both the primary and secondary 
markets. The secondary price is a function of all private information, and may not 
equal the true asset value. The payoff to investors participating in the IPO is 
determined by an uncertain initial market price, not the true value. Selling the shares 
in the primary market represents a transfer of risk to investors. By acquiring this risk 
investors insure the issuer against an adverse market reception to the offering. The 
premium for this insurance is the intentional underpricing. The issuer will generate 
information in the primary market that increases the precision of the estimate for the 
initial market price, reducing the necessary underpricing. 
Sisnalins model 
In the IPO underpricing literature, Allen and Faulhaber [1989], Grinblatt and 
Hwang [1989], Welch [1989] and Chemmanur [1993] point out that IPO underpricing 
may serve as a signaling device. By underpricing their shares in the IPO, good firms 
can signal their type. Then, the original owners of good firms may benefit from higher 
share prices when they sell their remaining equity in the secondary securities market 
(Allen and Faulhaber [1989], Grinblatt and Hwang [1989])，or when they arrange 
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future seasoned offerings (Welch [1989]). Furthermore, good firms may benefit from 
future analyst coverage (Chemmanur [1993]). 
MEASURING UNDERPRICING 
Underpricing is typically determined with reference to the initial return an 
investor receives, given a full allocation of shares. This return is measured by 
assuming investors sell their allocation on the first date of listing. The convention in 
most studies is to compare the closing pricing of the stock on its first day of listing 
with the offer price. We also use this form to measure initial return of retail industry 
of Hong Kong market. 
IRi = 100%*(Pi,i-Pi.o)/Pi,o 
Average IR= EIR i /N 
Where: 
IRj = initial return for company i 
Pi，i = the closing price on the first day of trading for company i 
Pi，o==the IPO offer price for company i 
N = the number of companies 
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
We calculate the initial return of 20 listed companies in retail industry. We 
find that underpricing is a general phenomenon since none of these companies gives 
negative initial return to investors, which means that in any IPO subscription of these 
companies, investors won't lose money on the first day. This conclusion is consistent 
with the underpricing in other countries and regions. Here we ignore the transaction 
cost which is necessary in reality. In table 3 and figure 1，we examine the frequency 
distribution of rate of return. 
Table 3 Frequency Distribution of initial return 
Range of % rate of initial ^^  ^ ° Frequency return ^ 
above 40% 4 
40% to 30% 3 
30% to 20% 4 
20% to 10% 4 
below 10% ^ 
Total 20 
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Figure 1 ： Frequencey Distibution 
hm 
Q I J I I j i S ^ l l _ _ J 醒 
above 40% to 30% to 20% to below 
40% 30% 20% 10% 10% 
As illustrated in table 3 and figure 1，the initial returns in retail industry are 
also evenly distributed in the ranges given. However, the initial returns of these retail 
companies vary from each other as the characteristics of their IPOs are quite different. 
Some companies have listed in Mainboard but some others in GEM since they may 
not fulfill the requirement of Mainboard listing rules. Some companies are from the 
Mainland and list in Hong Kong while other companies are local Hong Kong 
enterprises. It is widely know that Hong Kong is seriously affected duringthe Asian 
Financial Crisis in 1998 and therefore, we want to explore the difference of the initial 
returns for companies listed both before 1998 and after 1998. Moreover, the amount 
funds raised is also important to the extent of underpricing. 
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Underyricins from GEM/Mainboard perspective 
Table 4 Underpricing comparison between GEM and Mainboard 
Average 
Initial Return 
GEM Wumart — 13.34% 
Other(s) 12.27% 
sub average 12.49% 
Mainboard sub average 28.66% 
From table 4，we can see that the average initial return for mainboard 
companies is more than twice as that for GEM companies. The phenomenon is 
understandable as companies face stricter regulation requirements to list in Mainboard 
compared to list in GEM, which will make investors more confident in the financial 
performance and corporate governance for these Mainboard companies. In GEM 
category, the initial return of Wumart is a bit higher than the figure of others. This 
may be due to its larger market capitalization^. 
Underpricins from H/non-H share perspective 
Table 5 Underpricing comparison between H share and non-H share 
Average 
Initial Return 
H share Wumart 13.34% 
Other(s) 9.68% 
sub average 11.51% 
Non-H share sub average 26.07% 
3 See Appendix 1 for details. 
3 3 
From table 5, we can see that the average initial return for non-H share 
companies is more than twice as that for H share companies. We also notice that all 
these non-H shares are Hong Kong local companies. Information availability is one of 
the most important considerations for investment. Generally speaking, investors will 
bear more risk if they choose to invest in H share companies because of lacking 
necessary information of the Mainland market and government policy. In H share 
category, the initial return of Wumart is higher than the figure of the other company, 
Lianhua. In the Mainland, both of them are large players in retail industry. However, 
Wumart is a private company while Lianhua is a typical state-owned enterprise. So 
the different extents of underpring demonstrate that private Mainland companies are 
more appealing to investors. 
Underpricins from listine time perspective 




After 1998 Wumart" 13.34"/7 
Other(s) 14.83% 
sub average 14.72% 
Before 1998 sub average 43.00% 
According to table 6，the average initial return for the companies listed before 
1998 is significantly higher than that for those listed after 1998.. The confidence of 
Hong Kong investors were seriously destroyed especially in years just after the Asian 
Crisis and they did not show much enthusiasm to subscribe the unseasoned offerings. 
From another aspect, this also demonstrates the Hong Kong stock market is much 
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more mature after 1998，which would favor long-term healthy development. The 
initial return of Wumart is a bit lower than the average figure which may be caused by 
the listing in GEM rather than Mainboard. 
Underpncin2 from funds raised perspective 
Table 7 Underpricing from funds raised perspective 
m v n \ Average 
(腳) Initial Return 
Above 100 million Wumart 13.34% 
一 Others" 30.36% 
sub average 28.23% 
Below 100 million sub average 22.20% 
The above table 7 shows that the average initial return for the companies with 
funds raised above 100 million HKD is quite higher than for those with funds raised 
below 100 million. The initial return of Wumart is significantly lower than the figure 
of peers in same category - above 100 million. Partly because some companies in this 
category went IPO before 1998 which means the market atmosphere is quite favorable. 
In addition, other companies in this category with higher initial return are local 
companies which maybe better choice for local investors. 
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CONCLUSION 
Through empirical research of the companies in retail sector of Hong Kong 
stock market, most companies in this sector are underpriced in IPO, which is 
consistent with the current conclusion of this topic. Generally, subscription of IPOs of 
Mainboard, non-H share, higher funds raised will bring investors more return 
especially before 1998. Particularly, investors like to appreciate private Mainland 
companies more than State Owned Enterprises. 
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CHAPTER 5: POST-IPO PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
In Post- IPO performance area, many outstanding economists have contributed 
a lot. Some of the predominant papers are reviewed below: 
Jav.R.Ritter (1991) 
Ritter researched on 1526 EPOs between 1975 and 1984, obtained the three 
year return of 34.47%, while a sample of 1526 firms with the consistent industry and 
size had the return of 61.86%. Ritter therefore drew a conclusion that: '(1) investors 
are periodically overoptimistic about the earnings potential of young growth 
companies, and (2) firms take advantage of these "windows of opportunity".' 
Tom Loushran & Jay. R. Ritter (1995) 
The authors found that companies issuing during 1970-1990 had poor 
performance in a long run. Companies going public had only average 5% return every 
year during five year period after IPO, while the number for companies doing 
seasoned issued was only 7% 
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Alon Brav & Paul A Gomyers (1997) 
Brave and Gompers did research on a sample of 934 venture-backed IPOs and 
3407 nonventure-backed IPOs and found that underperformance was not due to IPO. 
Similar size and book to market firms which did not issue equity had the same poor 
performance as IPOs. 
BharatA. Jain & Omesh Kini (1994) 
Bharat A. Jain and Omesh Kini also found the poor Post-DPO performance. 
They also found that there was a positive relation between Post-EPO performance and 
equity retention by the original entrepreneurs while there was no relationship between 
Post-IPO operating performance and the level of initial underpricing. 
Now we conduct Post-IPO performance research based on weekly return basis. 
Since some companies in the data sample were brought public after 1997, this paper 
covers comparatively short time window of 12 months only. 
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MEASURING POST-IPO PERFORMANCE 
If a company i's closing prices on a given trading Monday4 t within a five-day 
trading week is Pi，t a weekly return is defined as the simple net return on stock i 
between two subsequent Mondays: 
( 1 ) r u = (Pi,t-Pi，t-5)/Pi，t-5 
(2) ARi,t=ri,t-rBM,t 
T 
( 3 ) C A R i , T = E A R i . t t=i 
N 
(4 ) C A R T = ( l / N ) * ( E C A R i , T ) i=l 
where 
ri，t the retum5 on stock i between two subsequent Mondays 
Pj,t the company i's closing prices on a given trading Monday t 
Pi,t-5 the company i's closing prices on a given trading Monday t-5 
ARj.t a benchmark-adjusted return for a given stock i in event week t 
rBM’t the benchmark's return rBM’t in week from t-5 to t 
CARjj cumulative abnormal return for company i over T trading weeks 
C A R T average cumulative abnormal return for N companies over T trading weeks 
Our data sample is composed of 20 listed companies including Wumart in the 
retail industry. The average cumulative abnormal return for these composite is 
4 If a holiday falls on a Monday, we use the next trading day instead. 
5 When we calculate the return in this article, we don't consider the transaction cost for simplicity. 
3 9 
negative, which is complied with the fact that some economists had also found. To be 
more specific, we do some deep diggings from four perspectives. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
We will compare post-DPO performance from three perspectives: 
GEM/Mainboard, H/non-H share, and the time point of 1998. Moreover, we will 
establish a linear regression model to analyze the relationship between underpricing 
and Post-IPO performance. 
Post-IPO performance from GEM/Mainboard perspective 




GEM Wumart ~ 60.71% 
Others -11.70%" 
sub average 3.48% 
Mainboard sub average -5.91% 
The result turns out that the after-IPO performance of GEM companies 
outperforms than that of Mainboard. The possible reason is some high quality 
companies in GEM generally have intention to transfer from GEM to Mainboard. To 
fulfill this goal, the management should improve the company's operating 
performance and promote the company's image. 
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Underpricins from H/non-H share perspective 




H Shares W u m ^ 60.71% 
Others 45.01%" 
sub average 52. 86% 
Non-H Shares sub average -10.02% 
From the table 9，we can find that companies from the Mainland have a higher 
average CAR in one year period than that of Hong Kong companies. The possible 
reason behind this phenomenon could be investors are not as familiar with Mainland 
companies as with Hong Kong companies. Thus, at the initial phrase, Mainland 
companies are undervalued. This undervaluation might be released gradually later. 
In the following, we will differentiate the companies by time point. In 1998， 
Asian Finance Crisis impacted Hong Kong capital market, and the stock market of 
Hong Kong was suffered greatly. Thus we have separated our samples into two 
groups: before and after 1998. 
� 
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Underpricins from listins time perspective 




After 1998 W u m ^ 60.71% 
Others 3.03% 
sub average 7.36% 
Before 1998 sub average -29.63% 
The post-IPO performance of companies listed after 1998 is better than that of 
companies listed before 1998. The possible reason is after the crisis, investors 
generally hold a more prudent attitude to the new listing companies. Thus these 
companies are undervalued and consequently are released. 
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CONSTRAINTS OF RESEARCH 
The first limitation of our research is the small sample size. We have just 20 
companies, which may reduce the significance of the statistical tests. The other is that 
the time of sample space is concentrating in recent years. Due to these factors, further 
studies should be considered using a larger sample in terms of number of firms and 




1. Initial Return and Cumulative Abnormal Return of IPOs in Retail Sector 
Funds p , . 
Listing Stock GEM / H/Non- Raised Initial '-emulative 
Date Code 灿me Mainboard H Share (million Return ；^bnormal 
J i K S ] Return 
25/1/1994 G990 xheme INT'L Mainboard Non H 97.20 22.31% 8.92% 
4/2/1994 09M Aeon Store Mainboard NonH ^^ .^OO 
(HK) -25.26% 
17/2/1994 G99(5 pHcerite GP. Mainboard NonH 69-00 73.330/0 -36.14% 
17/9/1996 0393 Glorious Sun Mainboard NonH 400.00 50 00% Enter. 15.61% 
6/12/1996 1179 M^abell Mainboard NonH 73.20 3 INTL.HDG. -63.99% 
6/5/1997 Luk F o ^ Mainboard N o n H • � 23.00% -76’94% 
H D C J . D N 1 L . ) 
13/6/1997 178 Sa Sa INT'L Mainboard NonH 897.74 53 3^0/^  
-22.47% 
13/4/2000 686 巧^�“ Mainboard NonH 15.83% 
GIANO 8.490/0 11/2/2002 130 J^ ^^ f®^^ ® Mainboard NonH 26.00% INT'L . -42.23% 
11/3/2002 1161 Water Oasis Mainboard NonH 88.13 io. l9% GP -36.85% 
10/5/2002 915 ynmark Mainboard NonH 32.14% Group 11.51% 
7/11/2002 221 ^e^jOi Mainboard NonH 20.00% 
Holdings 2.38% 
27/6/2003 980 Lianhua Mainboard H 9 ^go^ , ’ 45.01% 
16/7/2003 653 Mainboard NonH 59.08 14440/^ HOLD 93.25% 
15/4/2004 1212 ！!f^ ®^ Mainboard NonH 1718.10 o.60% � 
INT'L 30.09% 
11/12/2001 8020 Wanasports GEM NonH 9.09% -78.08% 
21/5/2002 8136 FX Creations GEM NonH 21.06 o.OO% , 65.29% 
17/6/2002 8126 &个」. GEM NonH 40.00% _ 
Holdings -18.07% 
27/6/2003 8272 gEM NonH 肌 0.00% , � � � � 
INT'L -15.95% 
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